This paper extends an existing cooperative multi-objective interaction programming problem with interaction constraint for two players or two agents . First, we define an s-optimal joint solution with weight vector to multi-objective interaction programming problem with interaction constraint for two players and get some properties of it. It is proved that the s-optimal joint solution with weight vector to the multi-objective interaction programming problem can be obtained by solving a corresponding mathematical programming problem. Then, we define another soptimal joint solution with weight value to multi-objective interaction programming problem with interaction constraint for two players and get some of its properties. It is proved that the soptimal joint solution with weight vector to multi-objective interaction programming problem can be obtained by solving a corresponding mathematical programming problem. Finally, we build a pricing multi-objective interaction programming model for a bi-level supply chain. Numerical results show that the interaction programming pricing model is better than Stackelberg pricing model and the joint pricing model.
Introduction
There exists a kind of interactional and complex decision-making problem characterized with conflicts, incompatibility and complexity among multiagent systems, which has received much attention from researchers. Ever since the 20th century, researchers have studied twoplayer and multiplayer interaction problems and developed a new field called Game Theory 1 , which has been widely applied in economics, engineering, military affairs, computers, and so forth 2, 3 . The game model contains the following main factors: players, strategies, and payoffs. In the game, people focus on finding the optimal strategies that benefit all the players, which are the equilibrium solutions or cooperative solutions to the interactional problems. In recent years, some researchers studied the cooperative games and negotiation games 4 , which laid emphasis on the cooperative rules, for example, multiagent model 5 . However, there are still some interactional problems that cannot be solved by the existing game models. In 1999, Meng and Li introduced a definition of interaction decision-making problems 6 , which mainly considers the multiagent decision-making problems that involve two persons and more and concerns how decision is made if the decision-making process of every agent is influenced by the other agents. Therefore, the interaction problems turn out to be the interaction decision-making problems. In some cases, the interaction decisionmaking problems may contain conflicts, so the interaction decision-making problems can be seen as an extension of the game models. The interaction decision-making model is complex and mainly contains the following five factors: decision makers persons or agents , sets of constraints, decision variables, objective function, and interactional constraints.
Some interaction decision-making problems can be described by nonlinear programming models with parameters, called interaction programming problem hereinafter called IPP and studied in 6 . Generally speaking, the game problems can always be described as interaction programming models. However, problems with conflicts and under complex constraints sometimes cannot be described by normal game models, for example, multiagent problems, and cannot be solved. After 1999, researchers made in-depth researches as to the existence and equivalence of the solution to and the method of solving the IPP 7-10 . Ma and Ding studied the relation between interaction programming and multiobjective programming by adopting the converse problem of parametric programming 8 . Meng et al. discussed two new types of IPP that are used to solve the problems with or without conflicts and introduced the definition of its joint optimal solution and the method of solving this model 9, 10 . Jiang et al. discussed the multiobjective interaction programming for two persons 11 .
In this paper, first, we introduce a definition of an s-optimal joint solution with weight vector to a multiobjective interaction programming problem with two players or two agents . In fact, Meng et al. have proved the s-optimal joint solution is a better solution to interaction programming problems than Nash equilibrium and can be obtained by solving an equivalent mathematical programming problem 7 . Moreover, the s-optimal joint solution is obtained under the assumption that all the decision makers make the same concession. For some interaction decision-making problems, there are always multiobjective decisions for decision-makers to make. Therefore, we are to extend the s-optimal joint solution of interaction programming problem discussed in 7, 11 to multiobjectives interaction programming problem with two players and study its properties. Then, we introduce a definition of s-optimal joint solution with weight value to a multiobjective interaction programming problem with two players or two agents , which differs from the definition of an s-optimal joint solution. Finally, we build an interaction programming pricing model for bilevel supply chain. Numerical results show that the pricing interaction programming model is better than a Stackelberg pricing model or a joint pricing model. 
s-Optimal Joint Solution
Let f : R m × R n → R k , g : R m × R n → R
FG
x, y satisfies the following constraint x, y ∈ H. Then, such multiobjectives interaction programming problem with interaction constraint is defined as two-player or two-agent multiobjective interaction programming problem FG , and H is called the interaction constraint. Let Z { x, y | x, y ∈ X, x, y ∈ Y, x, y ∈ H} be a feasible set to problem FG . Proof. For any x, y ∈ Z and i 1, 2, . . . k, it concludes from the assumption that
which implies
2.5
It follows with the assumption that
Then, by Definition 2.2, the proof completes.
By Theorem 2.3, for any x, y ∈ Z, there exists a joint value s such that x, y is an s-joint solution with weight vector λ to problem FG . The s-joint solution illustrates the same concession s the agents make. Furthermore, we define a joint value |s| s 1 s 2 · · · s k , expecting to get a minimum of all the joint values as an optimal solution with weight vector λ to problem FG . Remark 2.8. By Theorem 2.7, we can get an s * -optimal joint solution with weight vector λ to problem FG if the optimal solution to problem S is obtained. However, we cannot get the optimal joint value s * unless the optimal solutions to problems F i and G i i 1, 2, . . . , k are obtained.
s-Optimal Joint Solution with Weight Value
In this section, we discuss another optimal joint solution to FG , where f : 0, i 1, 2, . . . , k 1 , j 1, 2 
This completes the proof with Definition 3.1.
By Theorem 2.3, for all x, y ∈ X, and for all x, y ∈ Y , there exists a value s such that x, y becomes an s-joint solution with weight vector p, q to FG . s-joint solution implies the decision makers give the same concession s with weight vector p, q , which is fair for all the decision makers. Thus, it is useful for us to find the minimum of all the joint values. for any x, y ∈ Z. Thus, x , y is s -optimal joint solution with weight vector p, q to FG and s > s * , which contradicts the assumption of s < s * ; this completes the proof.
